University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
International Immersion Program Papers

Student Papers

2017

Dirty Deeds Done Dirt Cheap : the Economic and
Legal Challenges of Bringing Clean Energy
Innovation to the Russian Federation
Matt Klomparens

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
international_immersion_program_papers
Recommended Citation
Klomparens, Matt, "Dirty Deeds Done Dirt Cheap : the Economic and Legal Challenges of Bringing Clean Energy Innovation to the
Russian Federation" (2017). International Immersion Program Papers. 51.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/international_immersion_program_papers/51

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
International Immersion Program Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Dirty Deeds Done Dirt Cheap:
The Economic and Legal Challenges of Bringing Clean Energy
Innovation to the Russian Federation
By Matt Klomparens
In January 2016, Vladimir Putin signed an executive order
proclaiming that 2017 would be the Russian Federation’s “Year of the
Environment,” citing its goal to “attract public attention to Russia’s
environmental issues, preserving biodiversity, and ensuring environmental
security.” 1 This has prompted a range of domestic and foreign responses,
from cautious optimism to dismissive skepticism. 2 Indeed, a complicated
array of factors unique to Russia’s geographic, political, economic, and
diplomatic circumstances all make for an uncertain future for clean and
renewable energy sources in the Russian Federation.
This paper aims to explore the role of international actors and Russian
lawmakers in shaping Russia’s clean energy policies. Looking to instances of
private sector investment, international collaboration between academic
institutions, and homegrown entrepreneurship, there are some surprising
indicia that Russia has begun to make meaningful strides in its adoption of
renewable energy sources. At the same time, the limiting force of
Executive Order on Holding the Year of the Environment in 2017, Office of the
President of Russia (Jan 5, 2016, Kremlin), archived at https://perma.cc/FKA2CTF3.
2 Nick Bohmann, Russia’s Year of the Environment: Fact or Fiction? (American
Security Project, Nov 8, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/P4XG-H9NZ.
1
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international economic sanctions following the Russian annexation of the
Crimean region are clearly also having the effect of inhibiting foreign
investment in clean energy projects throughout Russia. Further, the Russian
state itself has taken a firm and nationalistic stance against many forms of
foreign investment in non-governmental organizations. These laws have
limited the willingness and ability of environmental rights activists to lobby
for policy changes toward clean energy. Entrenched state interests in
Russia’s monolithic and monopolized oil and gas sectors present additional
reasons for skepticism that Russian investment in renewable energy sources
is a legitimate priority.
Part I provides a cursory overview of Russia’s energy sectors, noting
the long-entrenched interests of Russian oil and gas producers as well as the
significant recent growth in certain renewable energy sectors. Part II looks to
the role of private sector organizations in the Russian energy economy and
highlights three important developments as signals that Russia’s cost-benefit
analysis may be shifting in favor of increased adoption of clean and
renewable energy projects. Part III explores the effects of the foreign
economic sanctions that have been imposed on Russia since 2014, including
their detrimental impact on the Russian economy, instilling a high degree of
uncertainty in foreign investors, and limiting the ability of Russian clean
energy enterprises to attain the investment capital needed to scale their
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operations and develop technological innovations. Part IV looks to the selfimposed limitations against foreign influence and investment capital in the
form of Russia’s “local content requirements” and “foreign agent” laws.
I. Overview of the Russian Federation’s Energy Industry
The Russian economy is highly dependent upon its energy production
infrastructure. According to the United States Energy Information
Administration, “Russia is the world’s largest producer of crude oil and the
second-largest producer of dry natural gas.” 3 In 2015, oil and natural gas
revenues accounted for 43% of Russia’s federal budget revenues. 4 Due to
Russia’s vast and diverse geography, the Russian Federation is one of the
world’s most resource-rich countries. 5 In 2005, the World Bank ranked
Russia as the country with the highest total estimated value of sub-soil
wealth in the world. 6 A subsequent study has reaffirmed this finding and
estimates the total value of Russia’s natural resources at $75.7 trillion USD. 7
Russia’s wealth of oil and natural gas reserves have helped the country to
weather political turmoil over the past two decades, to mitigate a debilitating
recession that began in 2009, and to deflect some effects of the U.S.-imposed
Energy Information Administration, Russia (Energy Information Administration,
Oct 25, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/B99G-ANAG.
4 Id.
5 Martin Russell, The Russian Economy: Will Russia Ever Catch Up? (European
Parliamentary Research Service, March 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/6NVKFP6L.
6 Id.
7 Id.
3
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economic sanctions that commenced in 2014. In addition to providing the
country’s chief exports and servicing Russian citizens with basic utilities, the
Russian energy sector is one of the most substantial sources of employment
in the Russian economy.
Russia’s oil and gas reserves have served as a valuable safety net, but
there are several indicia that this reliance has made Russia vulnerable and
unprepared to meet numerous risks and challenges facing private and
governmental energy interests worldwide. Much of the Russian energy
production infrastructure is outdated, which presents a host of potentially
costly risk factors. Pipelines and refineries must be maintained and updated
to avoid catastrophic spills and production accidents. Antiquated nuclear
power facilities pose significant health and safety risks to their employees
and citizens in neighboring towns. 8 Furthermore, increasing investments in
clean and renewable energy by European countries, combined with
international political pressure favoring environmentally-friendly energy
policies, is likely to result in decreased demand for Russian crude oil and
natural gas. These market forces may take an adverse effect on the Russian
energy economy sooner than anticipated, and Russia may find itself caught
flat-footed when forced to catch up in the new energy economy.

See Igor Koudrik, Alexander Nikitin, Second Life: The Questionable Safety of Life
Extensions for Russian Nuclear Power Plants, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Dec
13, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4S77-ZBPJ.

8
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Despite Russia’s slow start out of the gate towards modernizing its
energy infrastructure, there are some signs for optimism that President
Putin’s gesture for 2017 as the “Year of the Environment” is not merely
ceremonial. In 2016, Russia joined the Paris Agreement, promising to reduce
its greenhouse gas emissions by 70% of its 1990s levels by the year 2030. 9
Although Russia has drawn criticism for not going far enough with its
environmental commitments relative to most other countries, the tone of
Russian lawmakers concerning renewable energy investments has changed
significantly within the past two years. 10 Russia has seized upon
opportunities to gain international political points in criticizing the United
States for its decision to opt out of the Paris Agreement, noting that Russia
places “great significance” to the agreement and lamenting the reduced
effectiveness of the climate accord absent the United States’ participation. 11
Perhaps most promising of all, Russia remains on track to fulfill the
clean energy infrastructure commitments of former President Medvedev. In
2009, Medvedev’s energy plan mandated a more than 400% increase in
As numerous critics have pointed out, Russia’s use of a high, Soviet-era baseline
level of emissions essentially bases its reduction levels on an outlier. The country
could actually increase its current greenhouse gas emissions by 40% and still meet
its promised 2030 target. See Coral Davenport, A Change in Tone for Vladimir
Putin’s Climate Change Pledges, NY Times (Dec 1, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/4CAR-3FUQ.
10 See Henry Foy, Russia Struggles to Unleash Clean Energy Potential, Financial
Times (May 7, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/W846-ZPPZ.
11 See Ian Johnston, Russia backs the Paris agreement on climate change as Donald
Trump set to announce US Decision, Independent (June 1, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/S9LU-JA99.
9
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renewable energy utilization by 2020. 12 Through a mix of increased output
from existing hydroelectric and geothermal power plants, plus some proposed
investments in solar and wind power facilities, 13 Russia may be on track
toward realigning economic growth incentives in connection with renewable
energy commitments. The next Part takes a closer look at the nature of these
incentives from the perspective of the private sector, and tracks some of the
successes and failures in bringing clean energy investments to Russia.
II. Private Sector Investments and Incentives
The past decade has seen significant reform in several sectors of the
Russian energy economy. Keeping in mind the close state control of the oil
and gas sectors, the electricity sector has been subject to particularly
significant liberalization and privatization. Free market influence has
disrupted some of these stagnant sectors with inflows of major foreign
investments and efforts to modernize the Russian infrastructure. However,
for every Russian success story there is also a setback due to corruption or
international pressures against doing business with Russia. 14 Meanwhile, the
state-established Gaszprom, with its legal export monopoly, remains a
Woodrow Clark and Demitri Elkin, Russian Resources Start to Flow into
Renewable Energy (Huffington Post, Sept 29, 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/7SVC-CYK5.
13 Sunny Lewis, Russia’s Bright Renewable Energy Future (Max Impact Ecosystems,
Jan 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/8EXU-EFDP (noting governmental
approvals of 557 megawatts of renewable energy projects in 2015).
14 See Foy, Russia Struggles to Unleash Clean Energy Potential, Financial Times
(cited in note 10).
12
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formidable adversary against any meaningful attempts at competition in the
staple oil and gas sectors.
Even amidst the warranted skepticism that Russia’s administrative
state has bona fide incentives to prioritize clean energy development in the
short term, there are also signs of life that the Russian private sector is
making independent progress. In 2009, a multi-billionaire named Viktor
Vekselberg launched Hevel, an integrated solar power company. Hevel
opened a $320 million production plant in 2015, with additional expansion
plans on the horizon. 15 The company asserts that it will have capacity to
produce more than 300 megawatts of solar power by 2020.
The hydroelectric power sector also has enormous growth potential.
While most G8 countries utilize approximately 80% of their hydropower
potential, Russia—with the second-highest natural hydroelectric power
generation potential—utilizes only 20% of its potential. 16 Russia’s major
hydroelectric power producers, including the partially government-owned
RusHydro, have invested billions of dollars towards rejuvenating outdated
facilities, building new facilities, and pursuing modernized energy storage
solutions to allow for more efficient utilization of hydroelectric power.

Stephan Bierman and Anna Andrianova, Billionaire Vekselberg’s Hevel Opens
Solar Farm in Russia (Bloomberg, Feb 17, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/MD7Q-TJHJ.
16 BBC, Russia’s Huge Hydropower Potential, BBC (Nov 27, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/MJX7-PA93.
15
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RusHydro has participated in sizable investments in partnership with
Chinese investors towards expanding and modernizing its operations in the
Siberian region. The company has also participated in clean energy
investments outside of Russia, including $1 billion dollars in invested capital
towards hydroelectric projects in India. 17
Academic collaboration has also been an unlikely source of energy
innovation in Russia. In 2013, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
opened the Skoltech MIT Center for Electrochemical Energy Storage. The
facility has been home to researchers from MIT’s Materials Processing Center
and Lomonosov Moscow State University. This collaborative effort has borne
fruit, including technological advancements in energy storage technology. 18
In light of this and similar success stories, increased academic collaboration
may serve as a valuable driver of clean energy innovation—provided that
escalating tensions between Russian and Western governments does not
severely restrict prospective collaborative engagements between academic
research institutions.
III.

International Tensions and the Impact of Economic Sanctions
This Part reviews the nature and effects of the economic sanctions

imposed by the United States against Russia following the Russian
Reuters, Russian, Indian Funds to Invest $1 Billion in Hydro Power, Reuters (Dec
10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V47S-QXKF.
18 http://news.mit.edu/2015/fostering-us-russia-energy-innovation-0410.
17
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annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions have had clear detrimental
impact on the already struggling Russian economy, and many view the
sanctions as driving Russia to establish closer relationships with China and
countries in the Middle East region. Reasonable minds can debate whether
the sanctions have served their intended purpose, but one of the unavoidable
effects has been to limit in-flows of investment capital. Would-be clean energy
investors from the United States and various European countries opine that
they have been cut off from investing in clean energy infrastructure projects
in Russia. 19 The sanctions may have had the effect of making it even more
difficult for Russia to take affirmative steps away from its heavy reliance on
fossil fuels and to justify investments in modernized energy infrastructure.
Cutting off access to Western investment capital has likely worsened the
situation by severing the connection between environmentally-conscious
investors in the United States and technically proficient energy experts with
clean energy aspirations in Russia.

Maria Domanska and Szymon Kardas, The consequences of the Western financial
sanctions on the Russian economy, OSW (Mar 24, 2016) (“Obstructed access to
capital may delay, and in some cases even prevent, the implementation of important
energy infrastructure projects. One indirect consequences of the Western financial
sanctions is Moscow’s increased openness to participation in the Russian upstream
sector of foreign investors from other directions than the West (mainly from China
and India).”), archived at http://perma.cc/RFR9-5PWV.
19
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According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, foreign direct investment in Russia fell by 92% in 2015. 20 Some
scholars speculate that this precipitous drop was the result of a contracting
Russian economy coupled with the chilling effects imposed on Russian
investors due to the U.S.-imposed sanctions. 21 This “psychological scare”
resulted from sanctions targeted at “individuals or individual firms that may
have played a role in decisions about [the Crimean encroachment].” 22
In addition to the retraction of Western investment capital from Russia
as a result of the economic sanctions, there continues to be general unrest
and uncertainty about Russia’s relationships with other European countries.
Some of these uncertainties are quite complicated, the result of global
political, social, and economic factors, whereas others are as simple as
controversies over land rights. For example, prior to the Russian annexation
of the Crimean region, there were only four operating wind power plants in
Russia, producing a total of 15.4 megawatts per year. 23 The Crimean
territory was home to six wind power plants with a total production capacity
of more than 74 megawatts per year. However, due to uncertainties about

Knowledge@Wharton, Investing in Russia: Is the Risk Still Too High? Wharton
(Feb 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/3B9Q-679T.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 European Wind and Energy Association, Wind in Power: 2015 European Statistics
(European Wind and Energy Association, Feb 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/RY64-776D.
20
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which country in which these wind power plants are now located, the plants
have remained inoperative. 24 Similarly, uncertainty in the region has slowed
investments and private sector advancements toward capitalizing Crimea’s
sizable hydroelectric and geothermal energy production potential.
There are signs that the U.S.–Russia economic relationship will
continue to deteriorate before it improves. In June 2017, the U.S. Senate
passed a bill reinforcing the 2014 Obama-era sanctions and establishing
revocation authority with Congress rather than with the president. 25 The
sanctions would permit the president to “prohibit any United States person
from transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in debt or
equity” with Russian organizations. 26 Despite the enormous potential
economic returns and social welfare upside of modernizing Russia’s energy
infrastructure, U.S. investors are likely to find that the risks outweigh the
benefits so long as the economic sanctions policy remains in place.
IV.Russian Law as a Source of Self-Restraint
In addition to the key restrictions inhibiting the growth of clean and
renewable energy infrastructure development in Russia, such as economic
sanctions, international political conflict, insufficient skilled labor and

Eugene Gerden, Analysis: Russia Fails to Restart Crimean Projects (Wind Power
Monthly, Oct 22, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/KC6A-3VZG.
25 Kenneth Rapoza, The Senate Sets the Table for Full-Blown Russia Sanctions,
Forbes (June 19, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/J43R-NH3B.
26 Id.
24
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technical expertise, and deeply engrained reliance interests in statesponsored oil and gas production, there are further limitations and
exacerbations resulting from Russian legislation. “Local content
requirements” and the “foreign agent” law serve as self-imposed isolationist
mechanisms that are likely further limiting efforts to develop and modernize
Russia’s clean and renewable energy infrastructure.
Part II provided three examples as cause for optimism that the
Russian private sector and educational institutions are making advances
towards greater adoption of clean energy technology—namely, Hevel’s
expansion of wind power production, RusHyrdo’s hydroelectric power
investment activities, and the successful collaborative relationship between
researchers at MIT and Lomonosov Moscow State University. Despite these
signals of percolating growth and potential from the private and academic
sectors, a variety of economic and political roadblocks have served as
obstacles against foreign investment in clean energy infrastructure projects
in Russia. In addition to a slumping economy and an unstable ruble, Russian
laws also commonly impose “local content requirements.” Such requirements
mandate that private clean energy enterprises source a significant amount of
the materials and labor necessary to build their operations from Russian
resources and the Russian workforce. The scarcity of certain essential
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materials and technically skilled labor has made it difficult even for
homegrown Russian enterprises to profitably operate.
However, there are some positive signs that the Russian government is
open to temporarily relaxing local content requirements with respect to clean
energy producers. For example, in 2015, regulators decreased the local
content requirement as to wind power producers from 65% to 20%. The
requirement will gradually ratchet back up to 65% by 2024. In the mean
time, wind sector entrepreneurs have reacted favorably to the lowered
barriers to entry and shown a willingness to expand their investments and
operations. 27
In addition to the “local content requirements” imposed broadly by
Russian lawmakers across a variety of industry sectors with the effect of
raising artificial barriers to entry against prospective clean energy producers,
Russia’s “foreign agent” laws may also be inhibiting foreign investment in
energy sector projects. Enacted in 2012, the “foreign agent” law requires all
Russian non-profit organizations receiving foreign donations and engaged in
“political activity” to register with Russian officials as “foreign agents.” A
later amendment provided the Russian Justice Ministry with the authority to
label organizations at “foreign agents” at its discretion. Enforcement of this
law has had drastic consequences for non-profits, and to date at least 30
Eugene Gerden, Russia Eases Local Content Rules, Wind Power Monthly (July 20,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VXC5-97DF.

27
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organizations have shuttered as a result of being branded as “foreign
agents.” 28 According to Human Rights Watch, enforcement officials have
targeted “groups that work on human rights, the environment, LGBT issues,
health issues, . . . [and] social issues.” 11 of the 158 groups designated by the
Justice Ministry as “foreign agents” are environmentally focused, with
missions ranging from nuclear power safety, energy consumer protection, and
general green initiatives. 29
At least twenty organizations have been freed of the “foreign agent”
scarlet letter after satisfying the Justice Ministry’s requirements, and so the
labeling isn’t necessarily a death sentence. However, the law greatly restricts
the ability of Russian non-profits to solicit donations from and to develop
partnerships with foreign organizations with a shared mission. As a result,
environmentally focused non-profit organizations that would otherwise be
able to conduct research or serve as advisors towards the development and
utilization of foreign clean energy technology in Russia must rely entirely on
domestic funding to operate. This can be prohibitively difficult in Russia,
where the general population appears to be largely unconcerned about global

Human Rights Watch, Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups, Human Rights
Watch (June 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/76LQ-YDWU.
29 Id. See also Thomas Nilsen, Kola Eco Centre labeled as “foreign agents,” The
Barents Observer (Apr 24, 2017) (describing how the “foreign agent” law has
resulted in chilling potential partnerships between Russia-based environmental
NGOs and foreign organizations, as well as in increased reporting and auditing
costs), archived at http://perma.cc/E8YJ-TH6C.
28
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warming issues. 30 These limitations suggest that private sector organizations
will need to take on a greater share of burden towards clean and renewable
energy infrastructure developments. With Russian non-profits hamstrung by
the “foreign agent” law and private energy companies by foreign economic
sanctions, it seems that the vast majority of resources will need to be
homegrown. Even if there is a shift in the public mindset and a showing of
increased interest in clean energy development efforts, these laws will
severely limit the speed of adoption and technological development.
V. Conclusion
Finding itself at the center of heated international controversy, and
combined with its ongoing economic downturn, Russia has continued to rely
heavily on its pervasive oil and gas industry to stay afloat. As many other
countries make rapid advances in their adoption of clean and renewable
energy sources, Russian leadership have recently changed their message with
respect to decreasing their reliance on fossil fuels and modernizing Russia’s
clean energy infrastructure. Many have criticized these pronouncements as
token gestures, not yet supported by substance—however, there are growing
signs of life that Russia has begun to take clean energy improvement efforts
seriously. Untapped hydroelectric, geothermal, wind, and solar resources

See Richard Wike, What the World Thinks About Climate Change in 7 Charts, Pew
Research Center (Apr 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/KG8H-3REA.

30
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have the potential of rejuvenating the Russian economy and workforce while
also smoothing the country’s rocky foreign relationships.
Despite this potential, Russia is unlikely to garner much foreign
assistance in pursuit of a modernized energy infrastructure. One unfortunate
irony of the U.S.-imposed economic sanctions is its effect of limiting socially
beneficial investments in clean energy infrastructure developments and
instead tightening the pressure on the Russia’s oil and gas sectors to continue
serving as the engine to Russia’s economy. Similarly, Russia’s own selfimposed legislation concerning “local content requirements” and “foreign
agents” have severely limited the inflow of foreign investment capital,
resources, and technical expertise. These obstructions will likely need to be
lifted in order for Russia to keep pace as an increasing number of countries
realize the benefits of renewable energy innovations.
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